$100 billion climate finance target

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Vicente Paolo Yu

OECD inflates climate finance estimates ahead of COP26

Policy Pulse – 26 October 2021 – George Anjaparidze and Vicente Paolo Yu

Photo by Pascal Weiland on Unsplash

Key messages:

The OECD has overestimated the 2019 climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries by $46.9 billion.
The total shortfall in reaching the $100 billion target is about $67.4 billion, meaning that only $32.6 billion of climate finance has supported developing countries.
To avoid failure at COP 26, developed countries need to address the shortcoming in climate finance contributions by announcing a new pledge of $67.4 billion aimed at bridging the shortfall of the previous target.

Background on climate finance targets

Developed countries committed to provide $100 billion in climate finance by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. This commitment was first made by developed countries in December 2009 in Copenhagen under the Copenhagen Accord that was noted by the Parties at COP15. The target was subsequently reiterated through various annual decisions under the UNFCCC beginning in 2010 in Cancun at COP16. This commitment of $100 billion annually has been extended under the Paris Agreement upon its adoption in 2015 to the post-2020 period up to 2025. The finance targets are seen as key enablers for scaling-up climate action in developing countries and more broadly as confidence building measures. (For more context and information on climate finance see Veritas Global analysis from 21 April 2021: Climate Finance is the Key to Success).

OECD overestimates climate finance provided by developed countries

Measuring progress against climate finance targets is not straightforward. The lack of internationally agreed metrics for measuring performance against the $100 billion target makes it difficult to definitively estimate climate finance flows. However, the methodology used by the OECD secretariat to estimate climate finance flows leads to overestimation.

The OECD secretariat estimated that in 2019 the climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries was equal to $79.6 billion. The OECD figures overestimate climate finance provided by $46.9 billion in 2019. When adjusted for overestimating, the climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries is about $32.9 billion in 2019. Meaning there is a shortfall of $67.4 billion in reaching the climate finance target. (See chart). There are two main drivers for OECD overestimation:

Bilateral climate finance flows are overestimated by $20.3 billion in 2019. For bilateral climate finance, the OECD secretariat includes aggregation of projects that do not have climate change as the principal focus. A project that has climate change as a secondary objective is tagged as climate “significant”, even if the share of finance flowing to support climate specific activities is negligible. Once a project or program is tagged as climate “significant” most OECD countries report the finance based on a predetermined share (usually between 30% and 100%) as climate finance. This accounting practice of “climatewashing” bilateral assistance leads to significantly overestimating the scale of bilateral climate finance reported.
Multilateral climate finance flows are overestimated by $26.6 billion in 2019. For climate finance that flows through multilateral channels, the OECD secretariat includes both the annual contributions of developed countries to climate finance through multilateral channels as well as funding raised by the multilateral institutions themselves. However, since the $100 billion climate finance target is focused specifically on the finance provided and mobilized by developed countries (it is an outflow measure) it is not appropriate to count the resources mobilized by multilateral institutions towards the developed country annual climate finance target. Only direct contributions from developed countries to multilateral channels should be counted.

Implications for COP 26 and beyond

There is an urgent need to address the shortcoming in developed country climate finance contributions. As explained above, climate finance targets are key enablers for scaling-up climate action in developing countries and more broadly are confidence building measures.

As an immediate step, at COP 26, developed countries need to recognize that the previous climate finance targets have not been met and pledge to make-up for the shortfall. A new pledge, specifically targeting to close the previous shortfall, of $67.4 billion should be made at COP 26. A significant share of this finance should be pledged to flow through the Green Climate Fund. Developed countries should also show progress towards a post 2025 climate finance goal that is based on financial needs for climate action as expressed by developing countries in their NDCs.

In the medium term, there is a critical need to address the shortcomings of the current climate finance system. Improving the metrics and transparency of how developed countries meet their climate finance targets will be critical to restoring confidence of developing countries. Without better metrics and enhanced transparency, there is a risk that future climate finance targets will not be credible. As negotiators start to discuss setting new climate finance goals for 2025 and beyond, they will need to ensure that the approach meets expectations of developing countries with respect to additionality, adequacy, and predictability, and complies with long-standing commitments by developed countries under the UN Climate Convention and its Paris Agreement.

African Ministers of Environment called on the Glasgow COP to “set a new post 2025 climate finance mobilization goal with developed countries committing to mobilize jointly at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2030, of which 50% for mitigation and 50% for adaptation and a significant percentage on grant basis from a floor of USD 100 billion, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries and in particular the special circumstances of Africa.” The first Needs Determination Report, adopted at the 26th meeting of the Standing Committee on Finance, noted that the costed needs of developing countries up to 2030 amounted to about USD 5.9 trillion (summarized in Table 2 of the executive summary of the report). These estimates offer relevant benchmarks for the scale of the new climate finance commitments that developed countries should pledge.

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Briefing prepared by:

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Kapil Narula

Catalyzing Stakeholder Action for Affordable and Clean Energy for All

Policy Pulse - 24 May 2021 - Kapil Narula and George Anjaparidze

This article was first published on 13 May 2021 by Development Asia under the title Catalyzing Stakeholder Action to Achieve Affordable and Clean Energy for All. Development Asia is the Asian Development Bank's knowledge collaboration platform for sharing development experience and expertise, best practices, and technologies relevant to the Sustainable Development Goals.

Introduction

Sustainable energy is key to economic development and a better quality of life. Goal 7 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which is to ensure access to affordable and clean energy, and its five targets are critical for meeting the SDGs by 2030.

Despite multiple efforts at the international level, about 800 million people still do not have access to electricity, while 2.8 billion do not have access to clean cooking (2018). Energy efficiency improved by 1.7% but lags behind the 3% target, and the share of renewables in the global energy mix is only 17% (2018) and needs to increase substantially to meet long-term climate goals. Hence, consistent effort for scaling up action is essential.

Challenges

Many countries have adopted a cautious approach, prioritizing economic growth over aggressive action toward SDG 7. Low-income countries however simply do not have the natural, human, and financial resources to undertake the transition to clean energy on their own. National action plans look good on paper but are fragmented, and there is lack of accountability. Actions are often uncoordinated, inadequate to fulfil commitments, not backed by a legal framework, and lack citizen engagement.

International cooperation on clean energy, which is restricted by technology transfer issues, is proving to be challenging. Development of clean energy infrastructure in several low- and middle-income countries continues to be plagued by lack of finance and technology. There has been a further setback because of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic as governments turn their attention to more pressing public health issues.

Global Momentum for Action

In 2012, the United Nations (UN) declared 2014–2024 as the Decade of Sustainable Energy for All. In 2018, 46 countries presented their progress by undertaking voluntary reviews at the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) on Sustainable Development. In 2019, a mid-point review was undertaken for accelerating SDG 7, which was informed by various policy briefs. Key outcomes pointed to the need for catalytic actions that address interlinkages between energy and inequality and for strengthening cooperation. Recommendations included strong political commitment in the form of updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs), stepping up private financing and fiscal incentives, use of innovative tracking instruments, such as a multi-tier framework (MTF) for energy access and digitalization.

To further accelerate action on SDG 7, the UN General Assembly resolved to hold a high-level dialogue on energy in September 2021. This is the second time such an event is being convened after 1981, which signifies the importance of SDG 7. It is structured around three main themes: “energy access, energy transition, and enabling SDGs through inclusive, just energy transitions,” and supported by "innovation, technology and data," and "finance and investment" as cross-cutting themes. Within these themes, issues, such as access to clean energy services, energy system decarbonization, inclusive transition, application of big data and digitalization, research and capacity building measures, integrated energy policy making, regulation, mobilizing finance, fossil fuel subsidy reforms, climate proofing investments, risk management, and multi-sectoral interventions, will be addressed.

The preparatory process has started to prepare a global roadmap for scaling up efforts and developing concrete actions. This consists of three main initiatives: ministerial-level thematic forums, technical working groups and a stakeholder e-consultation process. For each theme, five to 10 countries act as global champions and are represented at the ministerial level. Thirty to 50 technical experts were identified for each of the five themes and have co-leads from multilateral development agencies. The groups have prepared annotated outlines that identify several gaps in their initial meetings and will hold cross-cutting discussions. They will present a final thematic report containing substantive recommendations to the ministerial thematic forum in June 2021. To mobilize citizen engagement and participation, stakeholders were invited to provide technical inputs, recommendations, and actionable examples. An inter-agency report will also be prepared as substantive background for the high-level dialogue.

The Need for Voluntary Stakeholder Action

Although national governments are the primary actors with the responsibility of setting the targets and providing an ecosystem for a clean energy transition, other stakeholders must contribute to the effort by undertaking voluntary actions. Sub-national actors, such as states, cities, and municipalities, must commit to take decentralized action, depending on their capabilities. Many cities have formulated a sustainable climate and energy action plan under the European Union Covenant of Mayors, and such efforts need to be globalized. Private businesses also need to contribute by undertaking commitments, such as participating in the UN Global Compact, a voluntary sustainability grouping of more than 12,000 companies. Lastly, citizens need to personally commit to a sustainable environmental footprint as behavioral changes supported by technology are essential for long-term changes.

There are several factors driving voluntary actions in the private sector. There is the realization that clean energy is the way ahead and makes business sense. Businesses earn mileage from projecting a green image, which can boost share prices. Shareholders also demand improved environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. These drivers are behind the steady increase in the volume of voluntary carbon markets.

Voluntary action by companies to purchase clean energy results is a market pull factor resulting in increased investment for renewable electricity production. For example, Google, which pledges to become carbon-free 24/7 by 2030, is financing the construction of new wind and solar plants and energy storage solutions so it can procure clean electricity from a nearby grid.

To step up voluntary actions, Energy Compacts are being formed as part of the UN high-level dialogue to get complementary commitments and amplify additional actions, key outcomes, implementation timelines, and tracking frameworks toward achieving SDG 7. Introductory and deep-dive workshops from April to June 2021 facilitate knowledge exchange and encourage member states, cities, businesses and citizen groups to register their voluntary commitments. Self-reporting is planned, and a web-based tool will be used to showcase the efforts of signatories.

Filling the Financing Gap

The overall financing requirement to meet SDG 7 is estimated at $1.3 trillion to $1.4 trillion per year, but current financing is approximately $514 billion. However, much of this gap ($800 billion) could have been filled if developed countries had met their commitments to mobilize $100 billion in climate finance annually by 2020 to cover the needs of developing countries under the Paris Agreement. This target for 2020 has been extended up to 2025. In the meantime, the annual shortfall is estimated at $67.1 billion.

Making good on this commitment has the potential to crowd in $600 billion in financing per year from other sources, assuming leverage ratios of existing channels for climate finance. However, some mitigation actions will not fall within the scope of SDG 7, and hence, additional financing will be needed.

One way is to channel pension funds to finance renewable energy projects as in the case of the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway, which has $1 trillion in assets. It divested $8 billion from oil and gas companies and is investing $5 billion in renewables. Removing consumer and producer fossil fuel subsidies, estimated at $500 billion globally (2017), can also bring fresh funds for clean energy access. Such actions are particularly important at an early stage while oversight provisions on aligning finance flows with climate goals are still being developed.

Revenues from carbon credits can support SDG 7 by aligning incentives for deploying clean energy. A well-functioning international carbon market can also ensure that opportunities are pursued where they are most cost-effective.

Private and public finance hold the key for catalyzing action, and innovative low-interest financing models for clean energy entrepreneurs need to be developed.

Meanwhile, other voluntary actions for accelerating SDG 7 include peer-to-peer trading of decentralized electricity generated from rooftop solar PV, self-generation by industries, and producing electricity from biomass.

For the more challenging SDG 7 target of universal access to clean cooking, sustainable solutions include smart solar PV or hydropowered microgrids using electric induction cooking and biogas for clean cooking, and integrated business models that sell both cookstoves and clean fuel. These ensure recurring revenue streams for companies and make clean fuel easily available to customers. “Pay as you go” financing models, micro lending, and community participation have also proven to be successful for de-risking investment.

Conclusion

Global momentum on energy action is building up as part of the UN high-level dialogue on energy. Apart from governments, it is important that businesses, communities, and individuals contribute to this effort. Energy compacts offer stakeholders an opportunity to participate in effecting widespread change. Financing remains key to achieving SDG 7 by 2030 and needs to be mobilized at scale.

Resources

A. Bhattacharya et al. 2020. Delivering on the $100 Billion Climate Finance Commitment and Transforming Climate Finance. The Independent Expert Group on Climate Finance.

United Nations. 2019. Accelerating SDG 7 Achievement. Policy Briefs.

United Nations. High-Level Dialogue on Energy 2021.

George Anjaparidze is managing partner of Veritas Global, a company in Geneva, Switzerland that provides economics and strategy advisory services worldwide with expertise in climate change, infrastructure and international development.

Kapil Narula is a senior researcher at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. He holds a PhD in Development Studies with a focus on energy, economics, sustainability, and policy. He has more than 18 years of work experience in the government, industry, academics and research.

George Anjaparidze

Climate Finance is the Key to Success for Biden Earth Day Summit and COP 26

Policy Pulse - 21 April 2021 - George Anjaparidze and Vicente Paolo Yu

Key messages

The Biden Earth Day Climate Summit can have a real impact on international climate change negotiations if it addresses the shortfall in international climate finance.
Developed countries have not met their commitment to provide $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries – the shortfall is likely to be about $67.1 billion per year.
To rebuild confidence, leaders need to use the Summit to recognize that developed countries’ climate finance commitments have not been met. Developed country leaders hence need to commit to put forward new climate finance pledges by COP 26 that make-up for the past shortfall.
In addition, developed country leaders need to also signal that they will live up to their continuing climate finance commitment to provide at least $100 billion annually in climate finance up to 2025 as called for by the Paris Agreement.
One immediate opportunity for the Biden administration is to contribute at least $8 billion to the Green Climate Fund as that would undo the previous US administration’s efforts to defund this fund.
More broadly, in the context of long-term climate finance, there is a critical need to address the shortcomings of the current climate finance system. As negotiators start to discuss setting new climate finance goals for 2025 and beyond, they will need to ensure that the approach meets expectations of developing countries with respect to additionality, adequacy, and predictability, and complies with long-standing commitments by developed countries under the UN Climate Convention and its Paris Agreement.

Photo by Micheile Henderson on Unsplash

1. What does success look like for the Earth Summit?

US President Biden is scheduled to convene 40 world leaders for the Earth Day Climate Summit on April 22 and 23, 2021. The Summit has the stated ambition to be a key milestone on the road to the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 26). To have a real positive impact on international climate negotiations, the developed country leaders at the Summit need to commit to address the shortfall in international climate finance.

Developed countries have not met their commitment to provide climate finance of $100 billion per year by 2020 that was promised to developing countries. The shortfall is likely to be about $67.1 billion per year in 2020 (see section 4 below). This shortcoming has eroded the credibility of developed countries and risks undermining the entire climate negotiations. Finance is a key enabler of climate action. Without a further scale-up in climate finance the needed scale-up in climate action in developing countries is unlikely.

To rebuild confidence, leaders need to first recognize that the climate finance targets have not been achieved. Developed country leaders hence need to commit to put forward new climate finance pledges by COP 26 that make-up for the past shortfall and live up to their continuing climate finance commitments up to 2025.

One immediate opportunity for the Biden administration is to contribute $8 billion to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as that would undo the previous US administration’s efforts to defund this fund.

The Trump administration defaulted on Obama-era commitments and refused to contribute to the fund’s latest replenishment. By making good on past commitments and participating on equal footing with other donors, the US has an opportunity to restore its credibility in international climate negotiations.

2. Background on climate finance negotiations

International climate finance negotiations cover an array of issues, including scale of resource mobilization, institutional arrangements, governance, access modalities and guidance on implementation. The focus of this brief is on climate finance negotiations specifically in the context of the scale of financial resource mobilization from developed countries.

The text of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) includes commitments for developed countries to provide finance to developing countries. However, at the time (early 1990s) when the Convention was being negotiated, there was no clear understanding on the scale of finance that would be needed. In fact, even today, knowledge on climate finance needs continues to evolve. Therefore, instead of setting prescriptive numerical finance targets, Parties agreed on overarching commitments.

One of the key overarching finance commitments is for developed countries to provide “agreed full costs” incurred by developing countries in preparing reports to the UNFCCC. Another key overarching finance commitment for developed countries is to provide financial resources to meet the “agreed full incremental costs” of implementing climate mitigation and adaptation measures and related international cooperation. Each of these overarching commitments are explained by the illustrative diagram below.[1]

Diagram 1:

Illustration of overarching UNFCCC finance commitments of developed countries

In effect, negotiations are about identifying what are the costs for developing countries and what share of these costs should be funded by developed countries.

3. The policy context of the $100 billion climate finance commitment

Measuring progress against climate finance targets is not straightforward. There are differences of perspective on which climate actions are eligible to be counted towards the $100 billion target. For example, some Parties consider the target to be only in the context of mitigation actions, with adaptation and other climate actions requiring additional support separate from this commitment. Furthermore, there are no agreed metrics and definitions for measuring climate finance flows. Nevertheless, a closer look at the policy context at the time when this target was adopted can help shed light on the expectations of negotiators.

In the years leading up to the adoption of these targets there was increasing awareness of the significant additional cost that would be associated with addressing climate change. The first independent and comprehensive global assessment that was used in policy deliberations was published by the UNFCCC secretariat in October 2007. The study estimated that the additional annual investment needs for developing countries in 2030 would be up to $97 billion to address climate mitigation and up to $67 billion to address climate change adaptation. Although these estimates proved to be far too conservative, they had a transformative impact on the climate finance negotiations. In effect, shifting the focus of discussion from millions to billions.

In the period leading up to the December 2009 Copenhagen conference, many other assessments were launched that further shed light on the scale of additional costs associated with climate action and the volume of investment needed above business-as-usual (BAU) development. For example, in January 2009, McKinsey & Co. estimated that additional annual investment in climate mitigation measures of €530 billion in 2020 and €810 billion in 2030 would be needed to achieve an emission trajectory consistent with containing global warming below 2°C. International Energy Agency analysis, published in June 2008, highlighted that additional annual investment (above BAU) of up to $1,100 billion would be needed up to 2050 for climate mitigation investments to achieve an emission trajectory consistent with containing global warming at about 2°C. In both of the mentioned studies the majority of abatement in greenhouse gas emissions would need to be made in developing countries.

The evidence from leading international organizations clearly showed that developing countries would need to make additional investments of hundreds of billions of US dollars per year under any scenario that targeted avoiding catastrophic impacts of climate change. The policy question facing negotiators was then what proportion of this additional cost would developed countries agree to cover. The political answer in 2009 was that developed countries would ramp-up climate finance efforts immediately and provide $100 billion per year in 2020. Even at this early stage, it was well understood that this figure only represented a fraction of the additional finance needed and that this figure would need to be scaled-up over time.

4. Has the $100 billion climate finance target been reached? No. Developed countries have not reached the target of providing $100 billion in climate finance by 2020. The lack of agreed metrics for measuring performance against this target makes it difficult to estimate the extent of the shortfall. We estimate that if 2020 flows are similar to those in 2018 (the latest year for which data is available) the shortfall will be at least $67.1 billion per year.

Diagram 2:

Developed countries have missed their climate finance target

We estimate the shortfall to be significantly larger compared to figures published by the OECD secretariat. The OECD secretariat overestimates the climate finance flows for several reasons, three issues are investigated below:

a) For bilateral climate finance, OECD includes aggregation of projects that do not have climate change as the principal focus. A project that has climate change as a secondary objective is automatically tagged as climate “significant”, even if the share of finance flowing to support climate specific activities is negligible. Once a project or program is tagged as climate “significant” most OECD countries report the finance based on a predetermined share (usually between 30% and 100%) as climate finance. This accounting practice leads to significantly overestimating the scale of bilateral climate finance reported. In 2018, the OECD secretariat overestimated bilateral climate finance by over 200% or about $23.0 billion.[2]

b) For climate finance channeled through multilateral channels, the OECD includes both the annual contributions of developed countries to climate finance through multilateral channels as well as funding raised directly by the multilateral institutions. For the latter, this is particularly a significant issue in the context of the climate finance that is mobilized by global and regional development banks. For climate finance raised directly by multilateral institutions, the OECD secretariat attributes this finance in proportion of the developed country share capital. Nevertheless, since the $100 billion climate finance target is focused specifically on the finance mobilized by developed countries (it is an outflow measure) it is not appropriate to count the resources raised directly by multilateral channels towards the developed country annual climate finance target. Therefore, if the focus is placed only on developed country annual climate finance outflows to multilateral channels, as called for by the target, it implies that in 2018 the OECD secretariat overestimated multilateral climate finance provided by developed countries by over 350% or about $23.1 billion.

c) More broadly, the approach taken by the OECD secretariat does not take into account business-as-usual finance from developed countries. In our view, this is something that needs to be incorporated into the assessment in the future. As explained earlier in the brief, the policy context in which the $100 billion target was set had to do with determining the portion of the additional cost of climate action in developing countries that would be funded by developed countries. This implies that the target is focused on measuring finance flows beyond business-as-usual. Different methods could be used to set the business-as-usual scenario. If the business-as-usual scenario for net ODA flows as measured in grant equivalents was set at the level of 2009 ($121 billion), the increase observed in overall flows in 2018 would be about $29 billion. Since the total ODA increase is more than the developed country contributions to climate finance through bilateral and multilateral channels no further adjustment has been applied in our assessment.

The approach used by the OECD secretariat has also come under criticism from developing country governments. For example, India critiqued the OECD’s approach to reporting and quantifying the climate financing provided by OECD countries. The estimates from the Biennial Assessment of the Standing Committee on Finance of the UNFCCC also point to significant shortfalls and indicate that developed countries provided only about $34 billion in 2016 through bilateral, regional and other channels.

5. What has been the likely cause of the shortfall in climate finance?

It is difficult to assess the drivers of the shortfall because at the time the target was set there was no indication of how it would be met. Some countries expected developed countries to meet the target mostly through grant-based finance, others expected it to be met mostly through carbon markets and yet others expected other approaches. The wide variety of views makes it difficult to undertake a definitive assessment of the causes of the shortfall. Nevertheless, the findings of the 2010 UN Secretary General’s high-level advisory group on climate finance (AGF) [3] provides a good reference point on what was the mainstream expectation at the time on sources for meeting the $100 billion climate finance goal.

Comparing expectations of the AGF with what has happened over the past decade, reveals two leading causes for not meeting the target. First the finance targets were missed because of lower-than-expected financial pledges of developed countries, which were particularly suppressed because the previous US administration (Trump) did not scale-up international climate finance contributions. Second, lower ambition in climate targets and restrictions on international cooperation depressed demand for carbon credits sourced from developing countries.

Table 1:

UN Advisory Group expectations in 2010 for meeting $100 billion target

6. What lies ahead for climate finance in the long term

Looking ahead, there is a critical need to address the shortcomings of the current climate finance system. Improving the metrics and transparency of how developed countries meet their climate finance targets will be critical to restoring confidence of developing countries. As negotiators start to discuss setting new climate finance goals for 2025 and beyond, they will need to ensure that the approach meets expectations of developing countries with respect to additionality, adequacy, and predictability, and complies with long-standing commitments by developed countries under the UN Climate Convention and its Paris Agreement.

The evidence on the additional cost of addressing climate change has greatly improved over the past two decades but it will no doubt continue to evolve. After the Copenhagen conference, especially during the negotiations in relation to the establishment of the GCF, other estimates were prepared. The South Centre, for example, estimated that the total adaptation and mitigation financial requirements of developing countries could well add up to at least $1,000 billion a year.[4]

More recently, in October 2018 IPCC Special Report estimated that to transform the energy system about $2.4 trillion per year of investment is needed to keep global warming within a 1.5°C scenario. Further resources will also be needed to support adaptation and other climate actions. An increase in climate actions by developing countries will also increases their needs for climate finance.

In addition, it is important not to lose sight of broader development challenges, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, an emerging debt crisis, and the impacts of climate change and biodiversity loss, that place a strain on the financial position of developing countries. Even in the absence of climate change, developing countries have had difficulties in meeting their financial needs of their “business-as-usual” development. Therefore, a dual focus is critically needed that on the one hand supports with additional resources to scale-up climate action while at the same time does not dilute the effort to address broader development challenges.

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Briefing prepared by:

Download PDF: Climate Finance is the Key to Success for Biden Earth Day Summit and COP 26

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[1] In addition to the two overarching finance commitments mentioned here, developed countries also have other commitments under the Convention on providing support to developing countries.

[2] This estimate also assumes that 100% of the finance is attributed to climate finance for projects that had climate change as the principal (or primary) objective.

[3] The AGF was chaired by former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Males Zenawi and former Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg. The membership included heads of state, ministers, heads of international organizations and other thought leaders.

[4] This does not include costs of preparing national communications, scientific development, data collection, building institutions to address climate change, education and training and other aspects of capacity building.