top of page
Color logo - no background.png

Policy Pulse

Thanks for subscribing

Join our readership of thought leaders and policy makers by subscribing to Policy Pulse, an update on trending policy issues in climate change, international conflict economics and infrastructure. 

Policy Pulse – 28 March 2022 – Veritas Global

Photo by Darya Jum on Unsplash


Key messages

  • Expanding Caspian natural gas pipeline supply will greatly benefit EU’s energy security in the 2030-time horizon and beyond

  • Had the White Stream project been realized, it would have brought more Caspian gas to EU, generating savings of between €24 bn to €48 bn in 2021 for natural gas users in EU

  • Increasing capacity of natural gas supply to EU will improve price stability

  • Support for receiving more LNG and development of new pipelines are mutually reinforcing policy measures that advance consumer interest

  • EU can continue to use natural gas indefinitely while cost-effectively meeting its 2050 net carbon neutrality target

Background and context


On 8 March 2022 the European Commission proposed measures for addressing EU’s energy insecurity. The proposal identified diversification of supply as one of the key levers for addressing EU energy security. Specifically, the proposal looks to increase supply of non-Russian natural gas by sourcing more Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and increasing imports of pipeline natural gas. Other measures covered by the proposal include reducing demand for natural gas through developing renewable substitutes, including hydrogen produced from renewable energy sources.


The European Commission proposal outlines in detail immediate measures that can be taken to reduce EU’s dependence on Russian natural gas. However, for the 2030-time horizon the proposal simply extrapolates the current measures. In our view, there is an opportunity to improve EU’s energy security over the 2030-time horizon and beyond through focusing on increasing the capacity of new pipelines.


Our previously published analysis “Caspian Gas Is Key to EU Supply Diversification” highlighted that enhancing access to Caspian and Central Asian natural gas is the best option for EU supply diversification. Caspian gas is a critically needed supplement to EU’s hydrogen strategy. The hydrogen strategy is an ambitious program for long-term decarbonization, but it does little to address EU’s energy security needs over the next two to three decades.


This policy brief explains how the full operationalization of the White Stream project, which would bring natural gas from the Caspian to EU, can contribute to price stability for European consumers. Furthermore, this brief explains how development of new natural gas pipelines and support for new LNG supply are mutually reinforcing policies. The brief also highlights that continued use of natural gas can be fully compatible with EU’s 2050 net carbon neutrality target.


Increasing capacity of natural gas supply to EU will improve price stability


As shown in Table 1, if the White Stream project had been implemented, there would have been an increase in supply of 5.8% in the European market which would have resulted in a 24% decrease in the wholesale price of natural gas. On aggregate, this would have generated savings for users in the European Union of between €24 bn to €48 bn in 2021.


Table 1: Savings to EU consumers in 2021 if White Stream had been implemented


The White Stream project, if fully operationalized, would bring 32 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas from the Caspian to the European Union, which is the equivalent of about 5.8% of total natural gas consumption across Europe in 2021.


On aggregate, demand for natural gas is inelastic, meaning a large change in price is needed to produce a small change in quantity consumed. Short-term price elasticity of demand is estimated at - 0.24, which means that a 10% increase in price reduces demand by about 2.4%. In the absence of an estimate for short-term price elasticity of supply, this value for price elasticity of demand is assumed to be a reasonable proxy.


Using this short-term price elasticity, would mean that a 5.8% increase in supply would translate to a 24% decrease in the price, which if applied to the total natural gas spending by consumers would translate to savings to natural gas users in EU of about €48 billion in 2021. A more conservative approach for estimating the potential savings would be to calculate impacts only against the price increase since 2019, which we estimate at about €100 billion in the wholesale market. Using this more conservative approach would imply savings to natural gas users in EU of about €24 billion in 2021. While each approach has its merits, the range offers the most relevant reference point for policy makers.


A crucial point to realize is that the benefits of lower gas prices accumulate downstream and eventually are passed on to consumers. Given the structure of the gas market, these benefits are not captured by natural gas suppliers. In effect, the benefits of lower prices are transferred from current suppliers to consumers. This characteristic of the gas market means that existing suppliers of natural gas are incentivized to discourage entry of new suppliers. Given these features, there is a strong case for public sector intervention in facilitating new entry and development of diversified supply infrastructure.


Support for new LNG and development of new pipelines are mutually reinforcing policy measures that advance consumer interest


In our view, there is an opportunity to improve EU’s energy security over the 2030-time horizon and beyond by focusing more on increasing the capacity of new pipelines bringing gas from the Caspian. According to the European Commission, about 80% (or 50 bcm per year) of the natural gas supply diversification is planned to come from increasing LNG supply. The remaining 20% (10 bcm per year), is planned to come from new gas transported by pipelines. While this approach may be appropriate for the short-term, it is not appropriate for the medium term. Priority should be given to developing new natural gas pipelines.


Natural gas production cost modeling for the European market, commissioned by the UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, identified a cost advantage of new pipeline gas projects over new LNG supply (See Figure 1). The production cost curve presented in Figure 1, identifies different sources of natural gas that could be supplied to the European market. The height of each bar corresponds to the cost of supplying the natural gas from a particular source to the European market whereas the width of the bar corresponds to the estimated volume that could be delivered per year from the identified source. Caspian gas offers a cost competitive option for supplying the European market and could deliver over 50 bcm per year.


Figure 1:

Base Case Gas Supply Cost Curve – 2035 (2015 prices)

Source: Fossil Fuel Supply Curves, Report of the UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, May 2016, prepared by Wood Mackenzie Ltd.


The impact of increasing access to new LNG compared to increasing new sources of piped gas has different consequences for the natural gas supply curve. The impacts from these mutually reinforcing measures would further European consumer interests.


Policy support that is targeted at increasing access to future LNG projects will flatten the slope on the tip (right-hand side) of the natural gas supply curve (see image I in Figure 2 below). The reason is because the vast majority of future LNG potential is on the right-hand side of the production cost curve, therefore, the supply response will largely impact this segment.


However, increasing support for gas from new (future) pipelines will shift the entire supply curve to the right. The shift will be less pronounced on the left-hand side of the supply curve and more pronounced in the middle (see image II in Figure 2 below). The scale and segment of the shift in the supply curve is presented in proportion to opportunities identified in the production cost curve from future piped gas.


If the two measures are pursued in parallel, the cumulative impact will be both a flattening of the slope of the tip of the supply curve and a shift in the supply curve. Basically, the sum of the two effects (see image III in Figure 2 below).


Figure 2:

Impact of policy support for new LNG and new pipes on natural gas supply curve


Box 1: The Geographic Market – Is it Just Europe or Europe and Asia?

A relevant technical point to note, is that this analysis is done using the assumption that the geographic market for natural gas is Europe. However, some analysts consider that the relevant geographic market is broader and should encompass both Europe and Asia, as the two regions are linked indirectly through LNG trade. In fact, the price correlation across leading European and Asian benchmarks increased to 0.93 in 2021 compared to below 0.8 in 2019. Nevertheless, a correlation in spot prices across LNG products should not necessarily be interpreted as the existence of a single geographic market.


However, even if a broader geographic market definition is applied, that encompasses both Europe and Asia, the scale of the benefits estimated in the analysis from adding additional capacity would not change. Although, the benefits would be distributed more widely, accruing to both European and Asian consumers in the broader Europe-Asia natural gas geographic market. The addition of 32 bcm in 2021 would have increased supply in the broader Europe-Asia geographic market by about 2.2%. If the same price elasticity assumptions are used, this increase of supply would correspond to a decrease in prices by 9.2%. The benefits to consumers in 2021 would still have been in the range of €24 bn to €48 bn but these saving would be distributed more widely across the broader Europe-Asia geographic market.


Even under the broader geographic market definition, there are compelling reasons why Europe would find it in its interest to secure higher volumes of natural gas supply from the Caspian. The lower production cost of Caspian gas makes it possible for Europe to potentially lock in supply at a lower rate than offered through new LNG projects. Piped Caspian gas also offers the possibility to have certainty of supply and reduce over reliance on new LNG capacity, access to which depends on continuously outbidding Asia. Furthermore, enhanced access to piped gas from the Caspian will help reduce exposure of Europe against supply disruptions in natural gas markets.

EU can continue to use natural gas indefinitely while cost-effectively meeting its 2050 carbon neutrality target


Carbon capture and storage technology offers a technically viable solution for capturing nearly all carbon dioxide emissions that result from the combustion of natural gas. Currently, this method is not economically attractive as it is cost prohibitive. However, with research, development, learning, and accommodative polices, carbon capture and storage technology has the potential to become commercially viable.


In the meantime, there are vast pools of cost-effective emission reduction opportunities in developing countries. The newly agreed rules at UNFCCC COP 26 for international collaboration under the Paris Agreement (also known as Article 6 of the Paris Agreement) offer an unparalleled opportunity for delivering the best greenhouse gas emission reductions, which can be used to offset emissions from using natural gas.


But capturing “tailpipe” emissions and offsetting are not the only options. The rapid progress in recent years in direct air carbon capture processes and technology has the potential to be truly transformational. Based on our forthcoming assessment, which is in the process of being peer reviewed, our estimate is that certain companies, through leveraging existing mature technology and process innovation, have achieved the ability to capture carbon directly from the air at a cost of between US$90 to US$130 per metric ton of carbon dioxide. While this is much more expensive than the abatement opportunities available in developing countries, it is comparable to the current price point of carbon emission permits in EU. The significance of this development is that direct air carbon capture conceptually offers endless opportunities for emission reductions at the same carbon price. In effect, this technology puts a price ceiling on reducing carbon emissions.


Whether it is through carbon capture and storage, carbon offsets, or direct air carbon capture processes, there are many options available for neutralizing greenhouse gas emissions. EU can continue to use natural gas indefinitely and still meet its 2050 carbon neutrality target without incurring huge costs. Natural gas plays an important role in enabling greater renewable energy deployment by offering a viable solution for balancing capacity to manage fluctuations in renewable energy supply. Except for nuclear power, electricity generated through natural gas currently offers the most viable and low-carbon alternative to coal-based power as a solution for intermittency.


__________


About Veritas Global: Our vision is to have a positive impact on the world through truthful advice informed by robust analysis. We are a premier provider of tailored solutions on climate change, international conflict economics and infrastructure.






 
 
 

Policy Pulse – 26 January 2022 – George Anjaparidze


Key messages:

  • Implementing climate finance commitments in 2022 and scaling-up flows from developed to developing countries will make-or-break international climate policy

  • For future mitigation plans to be more ambitious, current climate finance flows from developed to developing countries need to scale-up

  • Making good on developed countries’ climate finance commitment of $100 billion has the potential to crowd-in an additional $600 billion in financing per year from other sources


The upbeat tone in our last year’s 2021 outlook on international climate policy proved to be justified. The UK COP 26 presidency delivered a successful outcome at last year’s annual UN Climate Conference as part of both formal negotiations and momentum building initiatives organized on the side-lines. Crucially, COP 26 also agreed on rules on how countries can cooperate across borders to achieve Paris Agreement goals (also known as Article 6 negotiations). Having Egypt as the COP 27 incoming presidency bodes well for the negotiations process in the year ahead. Egypt has the trust and confidence from a broad range of countries combined with very strong capacity and excellent knowledge of climate negotiations, especially on climate finance issues.


We expect the focus of international climate policy in 2022 to be on implementation. There will of course continue to be calls by some to focus on policy development, for example to scale-up mitigation pledges as the gap between individual actions and collective ambition persists. However, given that the exercise of updating Nationally Determined Commitments (NDCs) was just completed at COP 26, we think a focus on further scaling-up of individual mitigation plans in 2022 is not productive. Instead, the focus will need to shift to implementation of climate policies at the national level but also on implementation of existing international commitments. Particularly pressing is the need to achieve the existing target on climate finance flows from developed to developing countries.


Climate finance is essential for enabling greater climate action in developing countries. Developed countries did not meet their existing commitment to provide $100 billion in climate finance by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency. The climate finance gap is much larger than officially reported by OECD because of flawed accounting methods used for reporting climate finance. The shortfall in reaching the $100 billion target is about $67.4 billion, meaning that in 2019 only $32.6 billion of climate finance has supported developing countries.


The $32.6 billion figure includes climate finance provided for adaptation. If we remove adaptation specific finance but retain mitigation and cross-cutting support, we estimate that only $27.2 billion of climate finance was provided by developed countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency. (Technical note: the $27.2 billion estimate is generated by subtracting the proportion of finance provided specifically for adaptation from total climate finance, the calculation is performed based on the ratio of adaptation specific finance in principal climate finance activities reported under the bilateral channel for 2019.)


As demonstrated in the chart below, the shortfall in the ambition of NDCs mirrors the shortfall in climate finance. The chart presents the status of communicated NDCs as reflected in the latest UNFCCC synthesis report from 17 September 2021. Some additional abatement measures were announced at COP 26 that are not reflected in the figures presented in the chart and it is important to note that the abatement target corresponds to both developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, the analysis presented in the chart captures well the correlation between globally planned emission reductions and delivered climate finance from developed to developing countries.

To have a realistic chance for the next round of updated NDCs to be significantly more ambitious, current climate finance flows need to scale-up. While new and more ambitious climate finance targets will also be necessary, there is an urgent need for developed countries to meet existing commitments and scale-up delivery of climate finance.


Climate finance is also critically important for meeting Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 7 which aims to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all. The overall additional financing required to meet SDG 7 is estimated at $1.3 trillion to $1.4 trillion per year, but current financing is approximately $514 billion. However, much of this gap could have been filled if developed countries had met their climate finance commitments. Making good on their climate finance commitment of $100 billion per year has the potential to crowd-in an additional $600 billion in financing per year from other sources, assuming leverage ratios of existing channels for climate finance. However, some mitigation actions will not fall within the scope of SDG 7, and hence, additional financing will be needed for SDG 7.


Below is a list of events in 2022 that could potentially serve as opportunities for developed countries to announce how they intend to follow through on their existing climate finance commitments:


Other key policy trends to watch in 2022:

  • Carbon pricing initiatives are likely to continue to gain momentum in 2022. The best mechanisms will create fiscal space, support the post-pandemic recovery while simultaneously set long-term development incentives in a climate conscious way.

  • Private sector financiers are increasingly mainstreaming climate change related considerations into business decision making. There is growing evidence that corporations that have adopted more environmentally conscious practices (particularly as it relates to corporate reporting) have been able to command a higher price for their stocks. Key developments to watch in 2022 relate to the regulatory interventions and voluntary actions that may be taken to make it attractive for capital providers to support climate friendly investments at sufficient scale.

  • The EU proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism targets heavy industry importers and will continue to be a focus of attention in 2022. Sectoral approaches can play an important role in scaling-up climate action. However, appropriate representation of stakeholders from industry and government is critical for ensuring schemes have the needed buy-in and impact. In 2022, it will be important to see whether the World Trade Organization could potentially create the space for deliberation on sectoral initiatives, for example those launched through bilateral and plurilateral approaches, to feed back into the multilateral system.

  • Due to travel restriction linked with the pandemic, the aviation industry had another difficult year in 2021. The year ahead is also filled with uncertainty. Despite the challenging business conditions, in 2021 the airline industry continued to show climate leadership by committing to net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050. For the target to be operationalized it will require development of a global scheme through building on the existing Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). Moving from an existing net-carbon neutral growth target to a net-zero carbon emissions target will require technical recalibration of the scheme design, some of these aspects are highlighted in the concluding section of the Policy Brief from the Harvard Project on Climate Agreement. If the sector starts to recover to its pre-pandemic levels in 2022, it will become a target for environment taxes and climate change related restrictions. Therefore, elaborating on how the sector will operationalize its new climate targets is likely to become increasingly urgent.

  • Important elements will also advance in 2022 under the UNFCCC, both through the inter-governmental process and the work program of the secretariat. In the context of the inter-governmental process the ministerial dialogue on climate finance, workshop of on loss and damage and activities related to fully operationalizing Article 6 will be some of the key developments to monitor in the year ahead. The work coordinated by the secretariat also promises to support greater transparency on how the convention is implemented.

___________________


About Veritas Global: Our vision is to have a positive impact on the world through truthful advice informed by robust analysis. We are a premier provider of tailored solutions on climate change, international conflict economics and infrastructure.

 
 
 

Policy Pulse – 16 November 2021 – George Anjaparidze

Photo by UNclimatechange on Flicker


Key messages:

  • Announcements at COP 26 side-lines could potentially be more impactful than outcomes from formal negotiations

  • Sectoral initiatives targeting steel and aluminum need better representation

  • The global sectoral approach developed for international aviation holds valuable lessons for the steel sector and other heavy industries

Announcements at COP 26 side-lines could potentially be more impactful than outcomes of formal negotiations


The UK successfully shepherded climate negotiations towards a meaningful outcome as host of this year’s main UN climate conference (COP 26). The outcome of formal negotiations resulted in incremental progress across almost the entire negotiating agenda. To achieve this progress at a time of significant shortfalls in promised climate finance is impressive. Perhaps most notably, several decisions were taken that were critically needed to unlock greater cross-border cooperation on climate change mitigation under the Paris Agreement, including cooperation through carbon markets. But this year, more so than any previous year, what happened on the side-lines of the COP was arguably just as consequential, if not more so, than the outcomes of formal negotiations.


The UK presidency used COP 26 to announce new coalitions across government and non-government stakeholders to advance sectoral initiatives. This was done largely through the World Leaders Summit by launching the “Breakthrough Agenda”, with its own process, timelines and checkpoints. The overarching aim of this agenda is to work together to make clean technologies and sustainable solutions the most affordable, accessible, and attractive option in each of the targeted sectors. In addition, stand-alone initiatives were also kicked-off such as the International Aviation Climate Ambition Coalition as well as targeted initiatives for addressing sustainable forest and land use. Sectors covered by announcements from forged coalitions include agriculture, aviation, forestry, hydrogen, power, road transport, and steel.


Other countries also used COP 26 as a platform to announce bilateral initiatives. Perhaps the most widely covered announcement by international press was the US-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on enhancing climate action in the 2020s. However, other bilateral initiatives such as the US-EU announcement to negotiate a carbon-based sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminum trade could potentially have the largest practical implications in the near term. Bilaterally led initiatives can morph into broader coalitions, as can be observed in the case of the Global Methane Pledge, where this US-EU led initiative now includes over one hundred countries.


Sectoral initiatives have potential to build momentum for identifying technically feasible options for scaling-up climate action. But if representation of stakeholders excludes major industry or government actors, there is a risk that such initiatives only have marginal impact. The upcoming 12th Ministerial of the World Trade Organization could be an opportunity to create processes that give space for sectoral initiatives launched through bilateral or plurilateral approaches to feed into the multilateral system in the future. For example, in the context of future work of the WTO on the nexus of climate change and trade.


Sectoral initiatives targeting steel and aluminum need better representation


Issues related to greenhouse gas emissions in the aluminum and steel sectors were not specifically on the formal negotiating agenda at COP 26. However, aluminum and steel are getting increasing attention due to EU plans to introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism targeting these sectors. Therefore, it is not surprising that announcements and declarations made on the side-lines of COP 26 targeted emissions from these sectors.


The steel sector is included in the "Breakthrough Agenda" launched at the World Leaders Summit. The initiative aims to have near-zero emission steel become the preferred choice in global markets, with efficient use and near-zero emission steel production established and growing in every region by 2030. The countries that have signed-up to the coalition include major steel producers in developed countries such as Japan, US and members of the EU as well as key producers among developing countries such as India, South Korea, and Turkey. However, the states included in the coalition only accounted for 31% of global crude steel production in 2019. Major steel producers such as China, Russia, and Brazil are not part of the coalition.


Furthermore, the US-EU announcement to develop a carbon-based sectoral arrangement that would include the steel sector would be representative of only about 13% of global crude steel production.


Lessons for the steel sector from international aviation


The first global sectoral approach that includes an absolute cap on CO2 emissions was developed for international aviation. The Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), adopted by the UN International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in October 2016, addresses the growth in total CO2 emissions from international aviation. The International Air Transport Association (IATA), which at the time represented about 84% of global air traffic, played a critical role in developing workable solutions for the scheme. (ICAO is an international governmental organization, and IATA is a business association.)


The approach and design elements of the multilateral agreement addressing growth in CO2 emissions from international aviation hold valuable lessons for developing other sectoral schemes. Key lessons are highlighted below:


Include representative perspectives from industry and government in scheme design


The options developed by IATA tapped into industry specific knowledge. While the discussions at ICAO were particularly useful in highlighting the diverse set of perspectives, especially from developing and emerging economies. The scheme design features were often developed in small groups (usually championed by industry leaders), but for approaches to be palatable internationally, buy-in was essential from representative governance structures, including a balance between industry and government.


The coalition announced at COP 26 to address emissions from the steel sector may need to enhance representation through either growing the coalition or finding ways to feed its proposals into multilateral bodies with appropriate representation such as the World Trade Organization.


Focus on largest producers


In 2018, about 90% of international air traffic was performed by airlines registered in 22 countries plus the European Free Trade Association area. The scheme was made mandatory only for operations to and from these countries, while other countries were exempted by a de minimis provision. Through this exemption it was possible to have more meaningful exchanges on scheme design. Subsequently, after scheme agreement, through various incentives all countries were encouraged to participate in the scheme.


In 2019, the top 20 steel producing countries made up about 90% of crude steel production. An approach that starts by focusing on the largest producers may also be appropriate for the steel sector.


Do not try to solve other grievances


During negotiations between airlines, there were several attempts to use the climate issue to correct for other grievances and imbalances. Such attempts were largely unproductive. Any perceived imbalances, for example due to subsidies or capacity manipulation, are best handled through separate interventions. Otherwise, there is a heightened risk of failure in addressing the core climate concerns and could lead to unnecessarily dragging out negotiations.


For media queries: contact@veritasglobal.ch

Briefing prepared by:







George Anjaparidze


About Veritas Global: Our vision is to have a positive impact on the world through truthful advice informed by robust analysis. We are a premier provider of tailored solutions on climate change, international conflict economics and infrastructure.




 
 
 
bottom of page